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A View From Jiangsu  Province
This paper provides an analytic  discussion  of China's complex  foreign  trade regime anel  suggests
policy reforms.  The papc;r  pays special attention to the implementation  of national trade policies at
provincial  and city levels.  This is important  for understanding  developments  in China's external  sector
because, during 1980s, provinces have cor.e to enjoy a high degree of autonomy.  I draw specific
examples  at provincial  and city levels from Jiangsu  province  and Wuxi  city.  Jiangsu is one of the fastest
growing  provinces  in China; it has also experienced  a rapid  growth in exports during the past 10 years.'
The paper is divided into five sections.  In Section 1, a brief history of the developments  in
China's foreign  trade regime is provided. In Section  2, I discuss the major institutions responsible  for
China's foreign trade.  In Section  3 and 4, I outline trade policies other policies affecting  fLh.1gn  trade,
respectively. In Section 5, some policy reforms are suggested.
1.  Evolution of China's Foreign Trade Regime 2
During the three decades following  the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC) :n
1949, a guiding principle of China's  economic strategy was self reliance.  Trade was relatively
unimportant  and grew rather slowly. Trade flows  were controlled  through a centralized  planning  system
under the Ministry of Foreign Trade (MI).  All trade was conducted  by 12 centralized  Foreign Trade
Corporations  (FTCs) organized along product lines and having branch offices in the main provinc-'s
producing  or utilizing their products.
'The paper is based partially on a mission to Jiangsu during the month  of September 1990.
"Ihis  section is based inter alia on the following sources:  the World Bank, China:  External
Trade and Capia,  1988; World Bank, China:  Between Plan and Market, 1990, Denny, David L.,
"Provincial Trade Patterns," China Business Review, September-October  1987, pp.  18-22; Ross,
Madelyn  C., "Foreign Trade Offensive," China Business  Review, July-August  1987; pp. 30-35, Ross,
Madelyn C.,  "Changing the Foreign Trade System," China Business  Review  May-June 1988, pp.
34-36; and Leung, Wayne, "Consolidating  Decentralization,"  China Trade Renor,  pp. 6-7.Starting  in 1978, China began to open its economy  to foreign trade.  Three major turning points
can be identified. First, in December 1978, China launched  its open-door  policy as a part of the overall
ecowomic  reform program. Second, in September  1984, the report on the Reform of the Trade System
was adopted.  Finally, in 1988, China adopted  the Plan for Restructuring the Foreign Trade System.
These changes  led to an increase in China's exports-to-GDP  ratio from 4.6% in 1978  to 12.7% in 1989.
The country's share in world exports grew from 0.8% to 1.7% over the same period.
In the following,  I  describe these reforms in some detail.
Developments  During 1979-1984. In July 1979, China enacted  the "Law of the PRC on Joint
Ventures Using  Chinese and Foreign Investment". This law permitted foreign investment  in China for
the first time since 1949. In order to attract foreign  investrnent  and boost exports, four Special  Economic
Zones (SEZs)  (Shenzhen,  Zhuhai, Shantou  and Xiamen)  were established  in 1980-81. This was followed
by the opening  of 14 coastal cities and the island  of Hainan in 1984.3
Several developments  took place during the period 1979-84. Branch offices of FTCs became
relatively  independent, provinces  created  their own FTCs to deal with specific foreign trade needs, and
line ministries established  their own FTCs to engage in trade in their products.  In 1979, a system of
foreign exchange  retention rights at the f-;vincial and etterprise level was instituted. Import licensing,
accompanied  by decentralization  of licew aig-autherity,  was also introduced.  These c4anges led to a
decline in the volume of trade controlled by the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade
3rhe SEZs and open coastal cities are aimed at attracting skills, technology and foreign capital  into
China. They operate under the so-clled  "open  policy" which gives them greater autonomy  in managing
foreign investment  than the rest of China.  This paper does not focus on issues of foreign investment.
For details on incentives  to foreign investment  in the SEZs and open coastal cities the reader should
consult  the World Bank, China:  Extermal  Trade and Cpital,  pp. 264-267.
2(MOFERT)  through the FTCs and their branches from 89% in 1981 to 72% in 1984.'  The share of
FrCs  controlled  by provinces and line ministries increased  correspondingly.
Developments  During 1985-87.  In September 1984, the State Council approved the report
submitted  by MOFERT  on Reform  of the Foreign Trade System. The general thrust of this  report was
towards  a transfer of power from the center to lower levels of administration. The report recommended
that FTCs be made independent  of their administrative  departments  and be given full authority to carry
out all day-to-day  functions  related to trade.  Subject  to the approval by MOFERT, large production
enterprises could be allowed to handle foreign trade themselves.  Tihe  report also recommended  the
adoption  of agency system under which FlCs  were to become passive agents of enterprises  and handle
exports and imports for a service charge leaving enterprises  responsible  for profits and losses.
The September 1984 report formed the basis of subsequent  trade reforms in China.  Various
changes  recommended  by the report were not implemented  immediately,  however. Indeed  along  the way
there were reversals involving  recentralization,  followed  by further attempts at decentralization, and
recentralization  once again.
Changes  made  as result  of the 1984  report  loosened  considerably  MOFERT's  control  over imports
and led to a sharp increase in trade deficit.  Alarmed by this, foreign trade officials reimposed  many
central controls.  For example, types of activities in which FTCs could engage and their ability to
compete  against one another came under a more strict control of MOFERT.  The system of licensing
became  more elaborate  than before. A large number  of export and import  items were placed under direct
control of MOFERT. 5
In spite of these reversals, the general direction  of China's foreign trade policy towards ezDx[L
exansio  did not change. In particular, China  targeted certain sectors for lateral economic  cooperation
'MOFERT was created in March 1982 by combining  the Ministry of Foreign Trade, Ministry of
Economic  Relations  with Foreign countries, Import  Export Commission  and Foreign Investment  Control
Commission.
5For  further details, see the article by David L. Denny mentioned  earlier.
3among  enterprises  to boost exports. This cooperation,  discussed  later in greater detail, took the form of
Production  Networks  for Export (PNEs) and export associations.
Developments During 1988-to-dat§. In  1988, China adopted the Plan for Restructuring the
Foreign Trade System.  This round of reforms stressed the implementation  of contract responsibility
system, increased  regional  autonomy,  and further integration  of production  and trade activities. The plan
enhanced further the role of e'iterprises, trading companies, and provincial and local govermnents  in
foreign trade decisions.
A detailed  discussion  of the 1988  trade reform with special reference  to Jiangsu  is provided  later
in the paper.  Before we move to the next section, hcwever, it is useful to note some additional
developments  during 1978-89. First, since 1980, the Chinese currency, renminbi, has been Oev&iued
several times with the result that the exchange  rate has changed from 1.5 renminbi per U.S. dollar in
1980 to  5.22 renminbi per U.S.  dollar in  1990.  Second, the foreign exchange retention system,
introduced in  1979, has evolved considerably. Third, starting in  1988, China started opening swap
centers where retained foreign exchange  can be bought and sold at market clearing  prices.  By August
1990, a total of 90 such centers  were already in operation. Fourth, in recent years, China  has encouraged
the formation of enterprise  groups along  the lines of Japanese  zaibatsu which combine the functions  of
production, trading and finance.  Finally, there has been an expansion  of the system of direct export
rights to firms.
Let us now turn to a discussion  of institutions  and trade policies as they exist currently.
2.  Institions
From the viewpoint  of trade, three institutions  are important: MOFERT  which makes  the major
trade policy decisions,  FTCs which carry out most of the business  finctions in the area of trade, and the
State Administration  of Exchange Control (SAEC) which regulates the sources and uses of foreign
exchange. We discuss below each of these in greater detail.
42.1  Ministy  of Forejign  Economic  Relations  and Trade (  ERE
MOFERT makes all the major policy decisions with respect to foreign trade.  It decides the
country's overall trade policy, formulates  national expoi: and import plans, issues licenses for exports
and imports  of commoditiis under central  jurisdiction, initiates  trade reforms, formulates  phoii.es with
respect to imports  of foreign technology  and investment,  and so on.
In each province, MOFERT  has a branch office.  Formally, this office is called the Provincial
Commission  of Foreign Economic  Relations  and Trade although  for ccnvenience  it is often referred to
as the provincial  commission  of MOFERT. A provincial  commission  is responsible  for management  and
planning  of provincial  imports  and exports, issuing  licenses  for exports and imports  of commodities  under
provincial  jurisdiction, and approval  of the range of commodities  to be covered  by different FTCs under
its jurisdiction. The provincial  conmmission  also confers the rights to trade directly on individual  firms
or enterprise  groups within  the province.
At the city level, there are Municipal  Commissions  of Foreign Economic  Relations  and Trade.
Generally,  these commissions  are under the supervision  of the relevant Provincial  MOFERT.
2.2  Foreign tade  Corwrations (FTCs) and Other Trading Entities
FrCs,  also referred to  as Import &  Export Corporations, constitute the business arm of
MOFERT. Leaving aside minor exceptions  to be noted below, all of China's exports and imports are
handled  by FTCs.
FTCs are organized along product lines and exist at national, provincial,  municipal and county
levels. At the national  level, they are  under MOFERT's  administrative  supervision  while  at the provincial
level they are under the relevant Commission  of MOFERT.  National FTCs procure goods for export
both directly  and through provincial  FTCs. It is estimated  that there are 5000  FITCs  in operation in China
currently.6
'See  Leung, Wayne,  "Consolidating  Decentralization," China Trade Report, June  1990, p  7.
Madelyn C. Ross in "Foreign Trade Offensive," China Business  Review, July-August  1987, p.34, put
this number  in 1987 at 1,200.
5There  are  three major functions of a  provincial FTC.  First,  it procures goods for  its
correspondent  central FTC.  Second, it exports direcdy commodities  that are not central monopolies.
For these commodities,  the FTC seeks  potential  buyers abroad,  signs contracts  with,  them, procures goods
in the home market and exports them.  Finally, *he  FTC imports  raw materials  required by enterprises.
At the city and county levels, FTCs are under the administrative  supervision of Municipal
Commission  of Foreign economic  Relations and Trade and under business  supervision  of corresponding
provincial  FTCs.  In Wuxi Municipality,  there are 9 FTCs.  In addition, the three counties under the
municipality  has one FTC each. Municipal  FTCs pr-ure  goods  for provincial  FTCs and can also export
directly.  County FTCs procure goods for the municipality  but sometimes  (as in the case of Jiang Yin
county in Wuxi) they can also procuire  goods for provincial FTCs.  Any goods beyond municipal  and
provincial quotas prw ured by county FTCs can be sold for a profit to FTCs in the same or other
provinces  or to national FTCs.
Be3ides  above  FTCs, there are a few other types of FTCs. Sometimes  enterprises  from different
localities  band together into an FTC on the basis  of certain common  interest, e.g., China  Bearing  Export
Corporation  and China Cable and Wire Export Corporation. There are also FTCs comprised  of regional
general trading corporations  in Guangdong,  Fujian, Shanghai,  Tianjin and Beijing.
A handful of enterprises and business groups also enjoy the rights to trade directly.  These
enterprises  and business  groups  can export  their output  and import  raw materials  necessary  for production
directly.  The rights to trade directly are conferred upon these enterprises by the relevant provincial
commission  of  MOFERT based on guidelines issued by the State.  In Jiangsu, there are 27 such
enterprises  and business  groups  at present. In 1989,  they exported  $80 million  worth  of goods amounting
to 3.28% of total provincial exports. Exchange retention  rights of these enterprises and groups are the
same as of other enterprises in the industry.
Finally, there are also reports of exports through illegal channels.  It appears that a large
proportion  of illegal  trade takes place with Hong Kong.  According  to one account, 'In the past, many
6exporters  sidestepped  the designated  foreign trade channels and sold their goods to Hong Kong agents
who paid them in foreign exchange.  The resulting 'export at any price' mentality drove down the
international  price of r.,any  Chinese  goods. MOFERT  6stimates  that in 1985,  parallel  trade through  Hong
Kong  decreased  the value of China's exports  by Y2 billion.  "7  A prominent  commodity  subject  to illegal
exports is silk.  It is reported  that as much as 37% of silk exported  to Hong Kong in 1986 went through
illegal channels.'
On the import side, a large number  of cases involving  seizure of goods by customs officials is
reported each year. In 19?S  alone, there were 26,000  such cases. The value of goods involved  in these
cases was $25 million and items confiscated  included watches, radios, cassette recorders, televisions,
video recorders, cars, motorcycles,  and chemical fiber products.  The magnitude  of u.idetected  illegal
trade is only a matter  of speculation.'
2.3  State Administration  of Foreign Exchange Control (SAEOC  and Foreign Exchange Adiustmel
C:enters  (FECs)
SAEC was created in 1984 to regulate the sources and uses of foreign exchange. It maintains
branch offices in provinces  as well as many municipalities. In addition to  controlling  the province's
sources and uses of foreign  exchange, a provincial  branch is responsible  for ensuring that the province's
foreign  exchange  contract  with the center is fulfilled. Between  May 1986  to March 1988, branch  offices
of the SAEC in most provinces also administered  foreign exchange adjustment  involving a  ransfer of
retained foreign  exchange  of one enterprise to another. Municipal  branches  of SAEC perform the same
functions  at the city level as provincial  branches  at the provincial  level.
7Ross,  Madelyn  C., "Changing  the Foreign  Trade System,"  China Business  Review, May-June  1988,
pp. 35.
'In  1986, official  exports of silk from China to Hong Kong amounted to $376 million.  For more
details on smuggling  of silk, see LoPinto,  B.M., "Fashioning  a Successful  SilkIndustry," ChinaBus'ines
Review, March-April  1988, pp. 54-56.
'For further details see, Chan, Yvonne  and Levy, Mimi, "The New Customs  Law," China Business
Review, November-December,  1987, pp 45-46.
7In 1988, a major development  took place in China in the area of foreign exchange. The central
government  decided to  establish Foreign Exchange Adjustment  Centers (FEACs) under SAEC in 57
cities." 0 Progress on establishing  these centers was swift and by August 1989, there were as many as
90 of them in operation. The main function  of FEACs, or swap centers as they are called popularly, is
to facilitate  purchase  and sale of retained  foreign exchange  at more or less a market clearing rate albeit
for specific purposes within the rules 1?;  duwn by the center.  In 1988, $6.26 billion, accounting  for
33.85% of forepgn  exchange  retained  by enterprises,  was traded at these centers."  By the end of 1990,
there were 12 FEACs in Jiangsu  province alone.
3.  Trade Policies12
In order to understand  the trade policy framework  in China, it is useful to divide the discussion
into three broad areas:  (i) export licensing, (ii) imports licensing, and (iii) tariffs and export taxes. In
the following, we describe each of these policy instruments  in detail.
3.1  Export Licensing.
Export licenses are divided into three categories.  MOFERT decides which commodities  are
included  in which category. Classification  of commodities  into  the three categoriLs  is adjusted  frequently.
Category  one goG,dq  are  under direct control  of MOFERT. In this category, all aspects  of exports
including  conclusion  of contracts, issuing of export licenses, and financing  are handled by MOFERT.
National FTCs have a monopoly  over these exports.  According  to the latest list available, dated June
1988, there are 27 commodities  including rice, pork, raw silk, raw cotton, cotton yarn, grey cotton
fabrics, diamonds,  crude oil, coal, and tungsten  on this list." 3
'0FEACs have existed in China since 1985. To our knowledge,  the firs  FEAC was established  in
Shenszhen.  See Yowell, Diane, "swap Center System to  Expand," China Business review, 1988,
September-October  1988, 10-12.
"See Brahm, L.J.,  'The Swap Service," China  Trade Report, November  1989, pp. 8-9.
'2For a more detailed account, see the World Ldnk, China: Between  Plan and Market, 1990.
"See Almanac  of China's FQreign  Economic  Relations  and Trade. 1989,  pp. 107-118,  for a complete
list of items under different categories  of exports.
8Category  two goods  are also subject  to MOFERT's mandatory  export plan. The main difference
between  this category and the previous one is that trade in this category is divided  into two parts. Export
contracts are concluded at the national level while export licensing, financing and other functions are
handled at local levels.  According  to the June 1988 list, in this category, export licenses  are issued for
41 commodities  by Special  Commissioners'  Offices  of MOFERT  and for 91 commodities  by commissions
of provinces, autonomous  regions, municipalities  directly under the central government and cities and
regions with separate  plans. Commodities  in category  two include  items such as frozen  pork, wool, toilet
pape,, live cattle, beef, mutton, ham, edible sugar, timber, groundnut oil, edible salt, carpet, cement,
steel products, knitted grey fabrics, and bed sheets.
Category three goods include all goods  not included  in categories  one and two.  Here no export
licenses are required and central government involvement  is minimal.  Trade in commodities  in this
category  is handled  at provincial  or local levels. A sizable  proporticn  of exports falls  under this category.
Several justifications  are nrovided  for restrictions  on exports of the products in categories lone
and two.  For certain commodities  such as rice and crude oil, it is argued  that they are staple resources
and that national  livelihood  depends  on them.  For some other commoditie..s  including raw silk and raw
cotton, it is felt that China has monopoly  power in the world market for them.  In the case of some raw
material exports, the restrictions  are intended  to encourage  exports of higher value added gouds. A final
possible  reason is that certain  goods are subject  voluntary  export restraints  in the world markn.  and have
to be allocated  by the central govermnent  among  provinces.
3.2 Import Licensing,
Like export licenses, import  licenses  are also divided into  three categories. In the first category,
we have goods for which licenses  are issued directly  by MOFERT. Some materials  in this category are
considered  essential for economic  development  while others are believed  to be price sensitive requiring
centralized  purchasing. In December 1987,  there were 14 items in this category including  steel products,
9timber, civil aircraft, petroleum, sugar, anh wool.  This list has grown longer since then and includes
automobiles.
For goods  in the second category, licenses  are issued  by MOFERT's commissions  in provinces,
autonomous  regions, municipalities  directly under the central government, and cities  nd regions with
separate  plans.  This category  of goods  is considered  important  for provinces  and includes  items  such as
washing machines, tape recorders, motorcycles,  cameras, watches, synthetic cloth, garrmnts made of
chemical  fabrics, and electronic  microscopes. In December 1987, the list contained  53 items.
Finally, there are goods for which licenses are issued by MOFERT's Special Commissioners'
Offices at major ports.  Items in  this  list are a  subset of  the previous two lists.  The Special
Commissioners  issue licenses  for the coastal cities  and for enterprises  with foreign investments  in regions
of their responsibility  for several of the commodities  in the first category.  They also issue licenses  for
commodities  in the second category  to enterprises  under uirect control of central departments  in regions
of their responsibility.
3.3 Exort  Taxes and Import Tariffs.
Export taxes and tariffs in China are governed by 'Regulations on Import and Export Duties"
promulgated  in March 1985  and amended in September 1987  by the State Council."' The trade taxes
are administered  by the General  Administration  of Customs  (GAC)  which  has branches  in each provincial-
level administrative  region. Tax schedules  are revised  frequently." 5
Export duties are levied on relatively few items.  In 1985, export duties were assessed  on 35
commodities  with rates ranging from 10 to 60 percent.  In January 1987, the number  of items subject  to
this tax fell to 8.
"Mhe  text of this law can ba found in Almanac  of Foreign Economic  Relations  and Trade, 1988,  pp.
163-166.
'5For a detailed discussion of trade taxes in China, see World Bank, China:  External Trade and
£wzaQ  i,  1988.
10The  system of  import tariffs is very  elaborate.  More than 2000 items categorized into
approximately 100 types of goods are subject import duties.  Tariff rates on imports fall into two
categories: general tariff rates and minimum  tariff rates.  The former apply to imports  from countries
with which China  does not have trade treaties  giving  reciprocal  favorable  treatment. The minimum  tariff
applies to countries with which China does have such treaties.  Countries in this group include United
States, Japan, Australia, Eastern Bloc countries, etc.
In 1987, minimum  rates ranged  from 3 to 150%  while general rates varied from 8 to 180%. It
appears  that import duties were  reduced in 1988. But during 1990, they were raised again.
In addition to minimum  and general tariffs, China also levies a "regulatory  tariff."  This tariff
works like a temporary import  surcharge. For example,  in January 1990,  regulatory  tariffs of 50% were
imposed on sweeteners, perfume, soap and dust catchers.  These items already carried rather high
ninimum and general tariffs. For example,  the minimum  and general tariffs on perfume  are 120% and
150%.
Imported  inputs used in the production  of exportables  are not subject  to import  duties. China  has
a system of export-duty  drawback in place under which duties paid on imports used in exportables  are
refunded  to enterprises. Materials  entering  the country  for processing  and assembly  and eventual  reexport
are also exempt  from duty.  This provision  helps reduce the anti-trade bias of the trade regime.
4.  Other Policies Affecting  Exports
There are several additional  policies which influence  exports.  We classify  them into six broad
categories:  (i) Export targeting policies, (ii) Direct export and import rights, (iii) Foreign exchange
retention  rights, (iv) Foreign  trade contracting  system  and export  targets, (v) Export pricing policies, and
(vi) Local policies affecting  exports.  We discuss  each of these policies in turn.
4.1  Export Targeting: Production  Networks  for Exports
The Seventh  Five Year Plan provided  for the creation of what are called Production  Networks
for Exports (PNEs). The idea behind  these networks  is to stimulate  the exports of advanced  enterprises
11within target industries. Participating  factories are selected  by the national  authorities. The networks'
objectives are to move into higher value added exports, improve  quality, multiply  categories and raise
competitiveness.
The first industry  group to benefit from this scheme  was machinery  and electrical goods. Plans
for a PNE in this industry group were approved  by the State Council in October 1985. Several  hundred
factories  producing  rather diverse  products  were selected  to participate  in the network. It was envisaged
that the government  will invest  $108 million  each  year for five years on technical  upgrading  of the chosen
facwories.  In addition, factories in the network were to be given guaranteed  supplies of raw materials,
power and packaging materials, preferential  access to transportation,  tax reductions or exemptions  on
imported equipment and materials, attractive purchase prices for their goods, and  higher foreign
exchange  retention  rights than other enterprises  in the same industry. By the end of 1987, exports of ten
products in the network  had reached  the level  of $100 million  or more. These  products included  watches,
radio-cassette  recorders, radios, hand tools, architectural  hardware, telephones,  television  sets and ships.
Production  Networks  for Exports  have also been created  in light industrial  products and textiles,
and farm and sideline products.  Recently, there has been a move to bring the export-oriented  rural
enterprises within the fold of PNEs. 16 Thus, in May 1990, 193 township  enterprises were chosen by
the national  govermnent  to participate  in PNEs.  Of these 193 enterprises  the largest number, 41, came
from Jiangsu.  As a part of the network, these enterprises will enjoy the same favorable pay and
conditions  as State enterprises  in the network.
4.2  Direct Export and Import Rights.
In recent years, China has encouraged  the policy of giving direct export and import rights to
qualified  enterprises  and enterprise  groups. There are two types of groups with these rights in Jiangsu.
Presently, these groups together  presumably  account  for less than 5% of Jiangsu's total exports.  But in
future, they may emerge as important  instruments  of growth in toreign trade.
16For  more details on PNEs, see Almanac  for China's Foreign Economic  Relations  and Trade, 1988,
pp. 83-85 and Madelyn  C. Ross, op. cit.
12The first group consists of enterprises that receive rights to trade directly from the Jiangsu
Commission  based on criteria laid  down by the center. There are 27 such  enterprises  and business  groups
in the province at present. In 1989, they exported $80 million worth of goods amounting  to 3.28% of
total provincial  exports.
Direct-export  rights can be granted  by a provincial  Commission  for only those goods not subject
to export  licensing (i.e., goods in category  three in Section  2.1) . The main criterion  for obtaining  these
rights is that the annual value  of goods exported  by the enterprise through  FT7Cs  at the time of application
be  Y1O million or  more.  In addition, the Corimission must be  satisfied with the  personnel's
qualifications  in the area of direct trading.
Within  three years of granting  of export  rights, direct exports of the enterprise must reach at least
Y3 million (revised  recently  from YS million). Otherwise,  the right to trade directly can be withdrawn.
Exchange retention rights of these enterprises and groups are the same as of other enterprises in the
industry.
The second group with direct export rights consists of some center designated enterprises or
enterprise groups.  Two examples in  this  category in Jiangsu are  Nanjing Radio Import-Export
Corporation and Nanjing Automobile  Import-Export  Corporation.  These corporations are allowed to
retain 100% of their foreign exchange. We were not provided  enough information  about these groups
but as far as we are able to judge, they are a part of the PNEs described above.
4.3  Exchange  Retention  Rights.
In order to encourage exports, China has put in place a rather elaborate system of foreign
exchange retention rights.  Retained  foreign exchange  can be either used for imports  permitted by the
13State  or sold for specific purposes  in a FEAC. 17 In effect, the system offsets partially  the negative  effect
of the overvalued  exchange  rate and/or the low renminbi  prices paid by FTCs on exports.
Rights to foreign exchange  generated  by exports are shared among the central, provincial and
municipal  governments,  FTrCs,  and the enterprise  responsible  for exports. Shares  of these recipients  may
differ by commodities  and have been revised  several  times  during the last 12 years. According  to current
shares, established  at the beginning  of 1991, for most of the  commodities,  20% of retention rights are
allocated  to the central government, 10% to provincial  and local governments, 10% to enterprises, aud
60% to FTCs.  This allocation is modified by a second round of transactions  according to which the
central government  can buy up to 10 and 20 percentage  points of retention  rights from enterprises and
FTCs, respectively,  at the exchange  rate prevailing  in FEACs. Thus, ultimately,  the central government
can acquire up to 50% of the foreign exchange  generated  by exports.  Further details on the current
sharing system are unavailable  but it appears  that for priority sectors such as machinery and electrical
goods, retention rights are more favorable to enterprises  and FTCs.
We have more detailed information on pre-1991 retention ratios.  these ratios differed by
commodities  and occasionally  by provinces. They also depended  on whether  or not exports in question
were in excess of the mandatory quota and whether or not the enterprise in question belonged to a
"MTe  central government  sets priorities for purchase and sales of foreign exchange.  According  to
the priorities prevailing in 1989, 5 items were given preference, another 3 we,ze  permitted if foreign
exchange was plentiful, and 6  items were prohibited.  The priority items were: (i) materials for
agriculture  (e.g., fertilizer and pesticides);  (ii) necessities  (e.g., rice, sugar and grain); (iii) raw materials
fior  light industry such as textiles; (iv) key projects which can generate  foreign exchange  for the country
(e.g.,  central government supported projects for technical updating and renovation); and (v) joint
ventures.  The three items allowed subject to the availability  of foreign exchange were:  (i) science,
technology, cultural exchange, medical equipment, education and sanitation; (ii) parts  needed by
electronic enterprises approved  by the central government; and (iii) raw materials for other industrial
enterprises. The prohibited  items  consisted  of (i) general consumption  items (e.g., cigarettes,  cosmetics,
soft drinks, and clothes); (ii) luxury go'ods (e.g.,  cars, refrigerators and gold); (iii) products made
domestically  (e.g., machinery, electronic  goods); (iv) foreign debt; (v)  leasing fees to be paid abroad;
and (vi) investment  abroad.
14Production  Network for Exports (PNE).  For instance, the retention rights were divided between the
center and provinces  in 75:25 ratio for within  quota exports  but in 20:80 ratio for above quota exports. 1 8
These rules did not apply uniformly to all industries and enterprises.  For example, in light
industry, arts & craft, and knitwear, the 20:80 sharing rule applied to  all exports.  Similarly, in
machinery  and electrical  goods  sector, for within  quota  exports, the split between  the center and provinces
was 35:65.  Moreover, enterprises  received  21 percentage  points out of the province's share rather than
the 12.5  percentage  points under the other two rules.  Incidentally,  machinery  and electrical  goods  sector
has also been  the one where the center has promoted  most vigorously  the Production  Network  for Exports
through a variety of incentives. 19
A point which deserves  noting is that retention  rights within  a sector are generally  uniform  across
enterprises. Thus, collectives,  TVEs and enterprises with direct export rights have the same retention
rights as state owned enterprises  who export  their goods  through FTCs.
Under the system prevailing  prior to 1991, buyers and sellers within the jurisdiction of a given
FEAC were normally  required to buy and sell retained  foreign  exchange  in that FEAC.  This meant that
exchange rates could vary across FEACs.  The reform introduced in January 1991 appears to have
relaxed this restriction. This change is in the right direction  since it will equalize the marginal  value of
foreign exchange  across various users.
4.4  Contracting  System and Export Targets
China has an elaborate system of contracts  to achieve its export and foreign exchange targets.
Thus, all provinces  are required  to sign annual contracts  with MOFERT  specifying  their export quotas,
the basic amount ot renminbi subsidy  to be received  for earning foreign exchange  through exports, and
18Under  the 75:25 division, the province's share was subdivided  as follows:  12.5% went to the
enterprise, 7.5% to the municipal commission  of MOFERT, and 5% to the provincial commission  of
MOFERT.  The corresponding  subdivision under 20:80 rule was:  55% to the FTC,  12.5% to the
enterprise, 7.5% to the municipal commission  of MOFERT and 5% to ihe provincial commission  of
MOFERT.
'9 For above-quota  exports, foreign  exchange  rights in this sector  were divided according  to the same
20:80 rule applicable  to other industries.
15foreign exchange  earnings  to be turned  over to the center. For three years starting  January 1988,  Jiangsu
was to provide foreign exchange worth $700 million annually to the center.  Any foreign exchange
generated  by Jiangsu  in excess of this amount  was to be shared in the 20:80 ratio between  the center and
the province.
In order to fulfill their contractual  obligations  to the center, provincial  commissions  sign contracts
with their subordinate bodies.  For example, Jiangsu Commission  of MOFERT signs contracts with
provincial  FTCs, municipal  commissions  under its jurisdiction  and some city and county  FTCs specifying
their export and foreign exchange quotas.2  Municipal  commissions  sign similar contracts with FTCs
both in the city and counties  under their jurisdiction. All FTCs, in turn, sign contracts  with enterprises,
collectives  and TVEs.
Contracts  in Jiangsu  between FTCs on the one hand and enterprises,  collectives  or TVEs on the
other may contain  three types of export  targets:  instructive,  indicative,  and market adjustable. 2 1 These
targets are generally negotiated  between the FTC and the enterprise. Instructive and indicative  targets
must be met commodity-by-commodity  as stated in the contract  whereas market adjustable  targets allow
a change in the mix goods.  For exports subject to instructive  targets, raw material supplies as well as
purchase  of the product are guaranteed. For the other two types of targets, neither of these guarantees
exists.  Sometimes  if an enterprise is having difficulty  in meeting its exports under an indicative  target,
however, the relevant FTC may provide assistance with respect to raw material procurement.  Any
exports in excess of targets in contracts can be sold through FTCs in other provinces.
As far as I have  been able ro ascertain,  instructive  targets  correspond  to the previously-mentioned
export quotas in  the province's and  municipalities' contracts.  They also  seem to  correspond to
'Nanjing municipality  which has a  provincial  level status receives its export and foreign exchange
quotas directly from the center.
2IAs far as one can ascertain, these contracts  differ across provinces and what hold true for Jiangsu
may not hold true for other provinces.
16MOFERT's command  plan for exports. In the same  vein, indicative  and market adjustable  targets seem
to correspond  to MOFERT's guidance  plan.
It  is perhaps important to  note that usually mandatory targets apply only to  state owned
enterprises. Collectives  and TVEs are subject  to these targets only rarely.  Furthermore, not all TVEs
that export are subject to export targets. For example, in Wuxi, there are approximately  700 exporting
TVEs. Only 400 of these  TVEs are subject  to any export  targets and those that are subject to mandatory
targets are much fewer.
4.5  ExRort  Pricing policies
Depending on the good, procurement  prices for exports in terms of renminbi are set by the
center, province or city.  For goods in category  one which are central monopoly,  prices are set by the
relevant  central  FTC.  Procurement  prices of goods in category  three are set at provincial  or city levels.
For category  two goods, it appears  that some prices are set by the center and some by provinces. The
mission was told that these prices are based on the FTC's estimate of production costs.  But it is not
entirely  clear how the FTC estimates  production  costs of enterprises.
Recently,  China has also encouraged  the formation  of export associations  which are authorized,
inter alia, to  "advise"  FTCs on prices.  The aim of these associations is to give order to export
marketing  by bringing competitive  entities  together  but in practice  they are likely to have effects similar
to those of a cartel. Currently, five such associations  exist. They cover electrical  goods, electronics  and
machinery;  cereals, oils, foodstuffs  and native  produce; metals and chemicals;  textiles and garments;  and
light industrial products, arts and crafts.  FTCs and any other enterprises with the right to engage in
direct foreign trade are supposed  to join the relevant association. An enterprise or FTC which refuses
to follow the association's advice can be expelled  from it following  which MOFERT  can withdraw the
enterprise's or FTC's right to export.2?
22See  Leung, Wayne, "Consolidating  Decentralization,"  China Trade Report, June 1990, pp. 6-7.
17Available  evidence  suggests  that on the average domestic sales prices exceed the prices paid by
FTCs to enterprises  for exports. In two specific  cases in which we were able to obtain information,  the
export price was substantially  below the corresponding  domestic price.  In  one of these cases, an
enterprise  with direct export  rights received  the highest  price on domestic  sales, followed  by direct-export
price and the price on exports through the FTC, in that order.  According  to the estimates  provided  to
the mission, on the average, in Jiangsu, export prices received by enterprises are 10% below the
corresponding  domestic prices.  This difference in prices exerts a negative effect on exports and
efficiency.
In all likelihood,  on the average, enterprises  incur losses on exports which are coverea partially
through higher prices on domestic sales.  Put differently, domestic consumers provide a cross-subsidy
on exports. In addition, it appears  that in setting procurement  prices, FTCs subsidize  high cost exports
at the expense of low cost exports.  Under the contract responsibility  system, any losses incurred on
purchases  of high-cost exports must be offset by profits on low-cost  exports.  Thus, FTCs seem  to use
their monopsony  power over enterprises  and sectors exhibiting  low costs of production. The implication
is that low-cost goods are exported in below-optimal  quantities  while the opposite is true of high-cost
exports.
Adoption  of the agency system under which FTCs work as pure intermediaries  and ship goods
abroad for a commission  has not made much  headway. For example, in Jiangsu, no more than 5% of
export  are shipped  under the agency  system. The same is not true on the import  side, however. At least
in Jiangsu, FTCs bring almost  all imports  on a comvmission  basis.  This means that any time the domestic
currency is devalued, as for  example in November 1990, its  impact on  the import price is felt
immediately in  Jiangsu.  The export price can,  by contrast, be  almost completely immune to  a
devaluation.
2'ro the extent of retention  rights which can be sold in FEACs at a market clearing  price, exporters
will experience  a price increase. But retention  rights of enterprises are limnited.
184.6  Local Policies Influencing  Exnorts
Our discussion  up to this point may suggest that provinces' exports are more or less governed
by the rules laid down by the center and that provinces has no policy levers to influence  trade flows.
This is, however, very far from the reality.
At  a  general level,  it must be  remembered that the  Chinese economic system is highly
decentralized  now and implementation  of policy is largely under the control  of provinces. For example,
the center gives mandatory  targets or export quotas  for only a limited  items and /or in limited volumes.
But in Jiangsu, contracts between  FTCs and enterprises  for indicative  and market adjustable  targets are
also h;nding. Similarly, in spite of the existence  of trade associations,  FTCs seem to continue to have
a great deal of power in setting export prices.  As noted before, taking advantage  of their monopsony
power, FTCs often set these prices below the corresponding  domestic  prices.
Jiangsu has other policy instruments at its disposal as well.  For example, within the State's
guidelines, provincial and city governments  decide how the raw materials imported by using locally
retained foreign exchange earnings are allocated among enterprises, collectives  and TVEs and across
different sectors.  Provinces and cities also provide indirect export subsidies  through the provision of
critical inputs such as power to export oriented enterprises. Further incentives  are provided in the form
of higher  bonuses  for managers  and employees  on the basis of export  performance. Within  the guidelines
laid down by the State, provinces can confer rights to trade directly upon enterprises and enterprise
groups.
A further important  instrument at the local level is the establishment  of joint ventures between
FTCs and enterprises.  During the Seventh  Plan, Wuxi City alone established 160 of these  ventures.
During the Eighth Plan the city will establish  another 200 such ventures. As Wuxi's plan is to expand
TVEs in a big way, 85% of these ventures  will be with TVEs. Thus, Wuxi will be able to influence  not
only the structure of output by choosing  joint ventures in priority sectors but will also enhance the role
of TVEs in its economy. Capital  for these ventures  will come largely from bank loans and partly from
19retained  profits of FTCs and Foreign Tra.-e Development  Fund which is in turn funded from profits on
sales of retained  foreign exchange  and from local taxes.
5.  Suggestions  for Further Reforms
China has come a long way towards  achieving  an outward orientation  of the economy  during the
1980s. The country's exports have expanded  rapidly during the last decade. This expansion  has in turn
helped accelerate  the growth  of per capita incomes. In order to continue  on this path, reforms in the area
of international  trade regime must continue.  Some of the reforms will have to be carried out at the
national  level while others can be carried out at the local level.7' In the following, we discuss reforms
at each of the two levels.
An important  qualification  must be kept in mind in evaluating  any policy reforms in centrally
planned economies.  The  prices prevailing in  these  economies do  not  normally reflect,  even
approximately,  the true opportunity  costs.  Therefore, strictly speaking,  one cannot  simply compare the
observed costs with world prices to decide whether  a particular sector should expand or contract. The
view taken below is that an encouragement  of procompetAtive  and pro free trade reforms is desirable.
5.1  Reforms at the National Level
(i)  The Licensing  Regime and Tariffs.  Despite  major reforms, there is much room for further
liberalization  of exports and imports. China's foreign trade is still very tightly controlled. Imports of
most consumer goods are virtually prohibited.  Often imports  of raw materials also requires licenses.
Even on the export side, a very large number  of goods is centrally  controlled. In commodities  for which
China has market power this control may be justified, although  even there excessive  restrictions lead to
smuggling  and a loss of foreign exchange  as happened  in the case of silk.'  In the commodities  where
'MThe  following  suggestions  assume that at least for a while, the basic economic  structure will not
change. In particular, it is assumed  that the planned  economy  will not be replaced  by a market economy.
21See  LoPinto,  Beverly  M., "Fashioning  a Successful  Silk Industry," China  Business  Review, March-
April 1988 for a fascinating  account of smuggling  in silk industry.
20China  does 1ot have market power, export  restrictions  make even less sense, especially  when the country
has a shortage of foreign exchange.
China should also consider  rationalization  of its tariff structure. Some  tariff rate are excessively
high and encourage  smuggling. There is a substantial  room for efficiency  gains from lowering  the tariffs.
(iH)  Eansion  of Direct Export Rights. The policy of conferring  direct export  and import  rights
upon firms is an extremely  important  development. Currently,  this instrument  is under-exploited  in two
respects. First, the rights are being  conferred very selectively. It is trtie that the failure to fulfill export
contracts by unreliable firms which manage  to get direct trade rights may undermine the reputation  of
more reliable exporters.  Yet it seems that the current approach is too conservative  and a more rapid
expansion  will enable more firms to establish  direct contacts  with their customers. Much can be learned
from direct dealings  with buyers. Often learning  effects and technology  acquisition  are the result  of direct
contact  with buyers. Second, firms which do have the rights to trade directiy  can only export  their own
products and import raw materials  for themselves. It will be desirable  to relax this constraint  and allow
direct traders to export other firms' products and import raw materials for them.  Reputation-conscious
firms will export only high quality products of smaller firms, especially  TVEs, who cannot afford their
own marketing  network.  Thus, reputation  of the exporting  firm in the world markets will most likely
be enhanced. At the same time, FTCs will be subject  to a greater competitive  pressure  to search  foreign
markets more thoroughly  in order to get higher prices for exports and lower prices of imports for their
clients.  The long term objective  should be to develop direct trading firms into a serious alternative  to
FTCs.
(iii)  Rationalization  of the Foreign Exchange  Retention  System.  Although the long term goal
of Chinese authorities is to move to a freely convertible currency, until that happens the system of
exchange retention rights will continue to play an important role.  Therefore, further reform of this
system makes sense.
21The reform introduced in January 1991 seems to have corrected some of the distortions in
retention  rates existing previously. In particular, for a given commodity,  retention  rates do not seem to
vary across provinces  or between  within  and above  quota exports. The rates do seem  to still vary across
commodities,  however.  Whether or not these variations are efficient is a complex issue.36 But on
grounds  of transparency  and administrative  simplicity,  a strong case can be made in favor of one or two
retention  rates.
A further issue concerns  the sharing of locally  retained foreign exchange. If the agency system
is introduced aggressively  for exports as recommended  below, almost all of locally retained foreign
exchange  should be given to exporting enterprises. The current practice of giving as much as 60% of
the foreign  exchange  generated  by above  quota exports  to FTCs leaves relatively  little foreign exchange
for enterprises.  The 60% retention makes specialiy  no sense when goods have been exported by an
enterprise with rights to trade directly. Moreover, FTCs presumably use the foreign exchange less
efficiently  than enterprises.
A final point is that under the newly introduced  system, the center is allowed  to buy back 30%
of the retained  foreign  exchange  from FTCs and enterprises. This gives the center a considerable  amount
of monopsony  power over the exchange  rate determined  in FEACs.  Moreover, even  though enterprises
make some profit on the sale of retained  foreign  exchange  to the center, they lose the flexibility  provided
previously  by the retention  rights.  Purely from the viewpoint  of enterprises,  the recent reform has taken
a step backwards.
(iVW  Fcs:  Expansion  of the Agency System.  The most important change required in the
operation of FTCs is the expansion  of the agency system in exports.  Under the current system, FTCs
do not make an effort to ensure that exports of each individual  commodity  are profitable. Instead,  since
they are required  only to ensure no lesses in the aggregate  under the contract  responsibility  system, they
'If  the central government's objective is to raise a certain amount of foreign exchange or to target
certain industries  for exports, the optimal structure of retention rates across commodities  will not be
uniform. At the same time the determination  of the optimal  structure  wil require the kind of information
that is difficult  to obtain for even advanced  industrial  countries.
22engage in a complex exercise of cross subsidization  of various activities.  This cross subsidization  is
economically  inefficient. Once  the agency  system  is introduced,  the cross subsidization  will be controlled
automatically.
A second area which deserves some attention is the existence of  monopsony power over
enterprises  on the part of FTCs.  This appears  to be particularly  true for within quota exports. Even if
enterprises are required to export a certain quantity of goods, there is no reason to require that those
exports go through a particular  FTC. If enterprises  are given  the option  to choose among  FTCs engaged
in exporting the given commodity  at least within the province, the latter will be under a greater
competitive  pressure.  For example, after the export quota has been determined, enterprises under
Nanjing municipality  could be allowed to export textiles through Jiangsu's provincial textiles FTC or
textiles  FTCs in other cities of the province.
5.  Export Targeting. One of the policies China  has followed  during the latter half of the 1980s
is that of export  targeting. So fa-, targeting  seems  to have worked well. For the future, two things  must
be remembered. First, experience  in countries  such as South  Korea suggests  that targeting  succeeds  only
so long as it is selective.  Second and more importantly, as soon as it appear-,  that the country has
targeted an industry in which it does not have a comparative  advantage,  the country should exit out of
that industry.  In a large number of countries, targeting has failed principally because governments
refused to exit out of the targeted industry even after it was clear that they were promoting wrong
industries.
6.  Export Pricing  Policies. The long term objective  of reforms policies should to encourage  the
determination  of prices via market forces.  Until this becomes  a reality, however, gains can be made by
reforming  the existing  system. A simple change  which will  go a long way towards promoting  efficiency
is to bring the domestic and exports prices of the same commodity  as close to each other as possib!e.
If the domestic  price of a commodity  is higher than the export  price, the marginal  benefit from domestic
consumption  is higher than that from exporting. The opposite is true when the domestic  price is lower
23than the export  price.  In both cases, welfare can be improved  by bringing  the two prices closer to each
other.
5.2  Reforms at Local Levels with Special  Reference  to Jiangsu
Some of the reforms mentioned  above can also be pursued partially at the provincial  level.  For
example,  Jiangsu  can be more aggressive  in conferring  the rights to trade directly. The province can  also
start implementing  the agency system more rapidly than it has done so far.  Finally, to the extent that
Jiangsu  has some freedom in setting  prices, it can reduce  the differences  between  the export and domestic
'wrices.
Some additional  changes  which Jiangsu can make to improve efficiency  are as follows.
(i)  Promotion and Decentralization  of TVEs.  Jiangsu has been a leader in the development  of
TVEs. Growth  of these  enterprises  should  continue  to be encouraged. Lately,  there appears  to be a trend
in Jiangsu to bring TVEs under a tighter control  of the city administration. This trend should be resisted.
In large part, TVEs are more dynamic  than state owned enterprises due to the fact that they operate in
a market environment.  If this feature is undermined, their efficiency and attractiveness will suffer
seriously.
(if  InEpr-ovincial  Trade. In published  sources, reports appear frequently  that provinces  restrict
the flow of goods from other provinces. Although we came across only a few cases of this nature in
Jiangsu,  the practice may be wider. Provinces  can gain from trade with other provinces  in the same way
that they gain from trading with other countries. Restrictions  on inter provincial  trade may confer  short
term gains on certain enterprises  but in the long run they will hurt Jiangsu's economy. If certain goods
and raw materials  are available  at lower prices  in other provinces,  Jiangsu  should  take advantage  of them.
Likewise, if certain goods  fetch higher  prices in other provinces,  Jiangsu should  profit from selling those
goods there.
(iii)  Formnation  of Industry Groups. Recently,  China has adopted  the policy of encouraging  the
formation of big industry groups along the lines of the Japanese zaibatsu which combine the functions
24production, trading and finance. This a development  in the right direction and Jiangsu should  take full
advantage  of it.  Industry groups  generate  important  economies  of scale and scope.  Moreover, they will
also facilitate  the process of reputation-  building  in the world market.
(iv)  Labor versus Capital Intensi -. Development.  Broadly speaking, China's comparative
advantage  lies in labor intensive  goods. Jiaugsu is perhaps no exception  in this regard.  Therefore, the
general direction of the economy  should be towards labor intensive goods. This objective  is consistent
with the objective  of the development  of TVEs.
In this context, an interesting  issue arises with respect to machinery  and electrical goods  sector.
Given the incentives provided by the national government, Jiangsu has rightly chosen to expand this
sector during the Eighth and Ninth Plans.  However, some of the goods in this sector are very capital
intensive. In choosing  among  the goods within  this sector, Jiangsu will need to be careful.  Otherwise,
the objective  of promoting  the machinery  sector  could come  in conflict  with that of promoting  TVEs and
labor intensive industries.
Lvj  Establishment  of a Rules Based Regime.  Currently Jiangsu has a variety of incentive
schemes  for exports at the provincial  as well as city level.  These schemes  take the form of preferential
access  to and/or lower prices of raw materials,  better access  to power, higher  bonuses  for managers  who
are successfl  in exporting, etc.  These incentives  are implemented  by negotiations  on an enterprise-by-
enterprise  basis.  This process is likely to be  distortionary  and inefficient. Efficiency can be increased
considerably  by devising  a rules based regime. For example, access  to raw materials  and power can be
made uniform and the available resources  can be used to give higher export prices.
6.  Summary
In this paper, I have made two broad contributions. First, I have laid out cleary various aspects
of China's foreign trade system at the central, provincial, and city levels.  This should be useful for
followers of Chinese  economy  because China's trading system is very complex and, to my knowledge,
25an upto  date, conveniently  accessible,  comprehensive  source describing  it is not available. Second,  I have
discussed  trade policy reforms which can help improve  the efficiency  of the existing system.  In doing
so, I have assumed that China is likely to move to a market economy only gradually.  Therefore,
piecemeal  reforms which improve  efficiency  and toster competition  are desirable.
Reforms  have been  sugested  both at the national  and local levels. Among  the reforms suggested
at the national  level are liberalization  of trade, expansion  of direct export rights, further rationalization
of foreign  exchange  retention  system, extension  of the agency  system  to exports and eliminate  divergence
between  the domestic and export prices. In targeting  sectors for exports, China  should be selective  and
willing to exit when targeted sector appears to be the wrong one.  A; local levels, town and village
enterprises  should be allowed  to operate as freely as possible, barriers to interprovincial  trade and labor
mobility should be removed, and industry groups should be encouraged  upto the point that they are
unable to exert any monopoly  power.
In concluding  the paper, it must be noted  that an important  factor responsible  for the phenomenal
growth  of exports in China which  has not been discussed  in this paper is direct foreign  investment. China
has made special efforts to attract  foreign  investors  particularly  in the four Special  Economic  Zones. The
general policy environment  in these zones is very liberal not merely with respect to foreign investment
but trade as well.  Foreign investors have contributed  not merely capital but critically  needed technical
know  how, management  skills, and access  to overseas markets. Future work which quantifies  the effects
of these factors on export and GDP growth and suggests  policy reforms in the area of direct foreign
nvestment  will be useful.
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